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LUIS CATÃO AND SANDEEP KAPUR*
A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debt-
to-income ratios systematically face higher spreads and more stringent borrowing
constraints than other countries with far higher debt ratios. Earlier research has
rationalized the phenomenon in terms of sovereign reputation and countries’dis-
tinct credit histories. This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence to
show that differences in underlying macroeconomic volatility are key. While volatil-
ity increases the need for international borrowing to help smooth domestic con-
sumption, the ability to borrow is constrained by the higher default risk that
volatility engenders. [JEL C23, F34]
I
t is a well-documented empirical regularity that developing countries typically
face an upward sloping supply schedule for international debt, and may be alto-
gether excluded from international capital markets at times (Díaz-Alejandro, 1984;
Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989; and Sachs, 1989). In a recent paper, Reinhart,
Rogoff, and Savastano (2003; RRS henceforth) take this evidence one step further.
Combining macroeconomic data for the post-1970 period with information about
sovereigns’ credit histories since the early nineteenth century, they argue that an
important subgroup of middle-income countries or “emerging markets” have been
systematically afflicted by what they call “debt intolerance.” That is, even though
their external debt-to-GDP ratios are moderate by international standards and
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substantially lower than those of several high-income countries, these economies are
perceived as riskier and unable to tolerate as much debt. Simply put, their sovereign
risk appears to be out of proportion to the size of the respective debt burdens.
To explain this phenomenon, RRS invoke history. Virtually all of these coun-
tries have tarnished credit histories, with several of them having defaulted a few
times on their public debts. To the extent that those that have defaulted once or
more are likely to do so again, the market threshold of what can be considered
“safe” borrowing levels for these countries tends to be lower.1 As a theoretical
story, however, this argument raises three questions. The first is whether lenders
have, in fact, systematically punished recalcitrant borrowers with higher spreads
and more limited market access historically—an issue about which the empirical
evidence has been mixed.2 Second, one is left with the question of what caused
serial defaulters to default in the first place. Third, one needs to explain how most
of today’s advanced economies—which have also defaulted several times in their
histories—managed to graduate out of the debt-intolerant “club.”
This paper advances a simple but arguably more fundamental explanation for
the debt-intolerance phenomenon. We contend that the underlying high volatility
of macroeconomic aggregates is a key driver of sovereign risk in developing coun-
tries. This volatility can stem from distinct sources, including long-rooted institu-
tional arrangements that tend to foster time-inconsistent policies and procyclical
fiscal outcomes, as well as from narrow commodity specialization that induces
terms-of-trade (TOT) instability. We argue that this greater volatility is associated
with higher default probability and, as a result, these countries face borrowing
constraints at lower levels of indebtedness. To the extent that such volatility stems
from structural and, hence, slowly evolving factors, the phenomenon can be fairly
persistent, even if there is scope for these countries to gradually evolve out of this
state. In this sense, we view the debt-intolerance phenomenon as another—and a
so far relatively neglected—manifestation of macroeconomic volatility on devel-
oping country welfare. The evidence provided in this paper thus bridges a gap
between the literature on sovereign debt and that on the adverse effects of macro-
economic volatility on growth and welfare (for example, Mendoza, 1995 and 1997;
Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Agénor and Aizenman, 1998; Caballero, 2000; and
Acemoglu and others, 2003).
1Lindert and Morton (1989) find that countries that defaulted over the 1820–1929 period were, on
average, 69 percent more likely to default in the 1930s, and those that incurred arrears and concessionary
reschedulings during 1940–79 were 70 percent more likely to default in the 1980s. The main shortcoming
of these estimates, however, is that they are not conditioned by changes in countries’ fundamentals.
Estimates of credit risk transition probability matrices conditional on a variety of macroeconomic funda-
mentals are provided in Hu, Kiesel, and Perraudin (2002). Their estimation exercise, however, is limited
to the post-1980 period.
2Looking at the interwar and early post–World War II comparisons of credit access to sovereigns with
distinct repayment records, Jorgensen and Sachs (1989) find that international capital markets have done a
fairly poor job in discriminating “bad” from “good” borrowers. In a similar vein, Eichengreen and Portes
(1986) do not find clear-cut support for the hypothesis that well-behaved debtors in the interwar period that
honored their debt obligations during the 1930s depression benefited from more favorable market access.
Looking at data from between 1968 and 1981, Ozler (1993) finds that past repayment record is statistically
significant in explaining differences among sovereign spreads across her sample of 26 developing countries.
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As discussed below, the thrust of our argument does not imply that the rela-
tionship between income volatility and default risk is straightforward. On the
one hand, greater income volatility suggests a higher probability of large negative
income shocks that lead to “nonstrategic” or “excusable” default along the lines of
a “capacity-to-pay” argument. On the other hand, Eaton and Gersovitz’s (1981)
classic model suggests an alternative relationship in which default is punished by
permanent exclusion from capital markets; because future exclusion is more costly
for borrowers with more volatile incomes, their model suggests that greater volatil-
ity tends to decrease the likelihood of strategic default. Yet income volatility also
affects the likelihood of default through other channels. First, volatility may affect
the level of indebtedness that, in turn, tends to be positively related to default risk.
Some models ignore this by assuming either that the level of indebtedness is exoge-
nously given or that the borrower chooses to borrow as much as the lenders will
allow (see, for instance, Grossman and Van Huyck, 1988; Grossman and Hahn,
1999; and Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2005). Second, volatility affects the terms on which
lenders can borrow, with countries that have more volatile incomes often paying a
higher risk premium. It is quite possible that countries that can access capital mar-
kets on less-than-advantageous terms care less about maintaining future access to
these markets, so they may be more inclined to default in times of crises.
This paper aims to disentangle some of these complex effects in the context of
a simple model and by presenting new econometric evidence on the roles of
volatility, credit history, and other controls on default probabilities and borrowing
capacity. In the model, the optimal level of debt trades off the benefit of borrow-
ing in providing consumption insurance against bad output realization versus the
cost of a higher borrowing spread. This spread is shown to be increasing on under-
lying macroeconomic volatility as well as (possibly) on a poorer credit history.
Because greater volatility increases the risk premium for any given level of debt,
this tends to dampen borrowing. Conversely, as borrowing is motivated by con-
sumption smoothing, increased volatility increases the incentive to borrow. We
find that whereas volatility may have an ambiguous effect on the optimal level of
debt, the ex ante probability of default unambiguously increases in volatility.
Looking at the empirical evidence in light of this theoretical perspective, we
examine the extent to which volatility and countries’repayment histories explain
default risk over and above other standard controls proposed in the literature. Logit
estimates of default probabilities in a cross-country panel spanning the 1970–2001
period clearly indicate that output and TOT volatility are highly significant in
explaining sovereign risk—a result that is strikingly robust to the inclusion of the
various explanatory variables considered in previous studies. At the same time, our
estimates show that once volatility variables are included in the regression, the
credit history variable used by RRS is no longer statistically significant. This sug-
gests that countries’credit histories may be, at least in part, proxying for the effects
of volatility on sovereign risk not contemplated in the RRS regressions.
We then turn to the issue of how volatility affects sovereign indebtedness. As
noted above, a rise in volatility increases loan demand for consumption smoothing
purposes, but it also has a supply deterrent effect through higher spreads that may
become binding at times; thus, we consider a model that allows for the switch
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between the two regimes. The respective econometric results indicate that the sup-
ply effect predominates most of the time, so that the net effect of volatility on
indebtedness tends to be negative. This, in turn, helps explain the second pillar of
the debt-intolerance phenomenon documented by RRS—that is, why more volatile
countries (which naturally tend to default more often) rarely manage to attain very
high levels of sovereign debt relative to income. This explanation is arguably a
more fundamental explanation for debt intolerance, in as much as it highlights a
mechanism through which certain types of sovereigns default not only once but
also repeatedly thereafter. This contrasts with the “virtuous circle” pattern often
observed in countries with intrinsically less volatile TOT and income, which can
attain higher indebtedness levels without incurring serial default.
I. Model
We assume that sovereign borrowing is motivated by the desire to smooth con-
sumption in the face of domestic income shocks. The sovereign borrower can be
viewed as a government that borrows to smooth its own consumption given volatile
revenues, or one that borrows on behalf of its citizens to smooth their consumption
given the variability of national income. Our benchmark model has two periods. In
the first period, the sovereign chooses its level of borrowing; in the second period,
after the realization of its random income, the sovereign chooses whether or not to
repay its debt. If the debt is not fully repaid, the lender can impose sanctions that
cause the borrower to lose a proportion of its period-2 output. We build on this stan-
dard framework (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, chapter 6) to develop the impact
of volatility on sovereign risk and optimal borrowing.
We assume that funds borrowed by the sovereign are either held as central
bank reserves or invested domestically; however, in each case, they yield the
international risk-free interest rate. With debt D > 0 in period 1, total income
gross of debt repayment in period 2 is
where Y – is mean autarkic output, ε∈[−εm, εm] is a random shock with zero mean,
and R is the gross risk-free interest rate. The debt contract requires the sovereign
to repay RLD in period 2. The spread between the contractual rate RL and the risk-
free rate R reflects country-specific default risk: the possibility that the sovereign
may choose to renege on its repayment obligation.
Lenders have access to an enforcement technology. In the event of default,
they can capture a fraction η of the borrower’s period-2 income.3 In this simple
YD Y R D 2 1 () =+ + ε ,( )
3This simple parametrization of borrowers’ losses associated with default has been advanced in Sachs
(1984) and Sachs and Cohen (1985). Cohen (1992) provides measures of the relatively large output costs of
default incurred by borrowers during the 1980s debt crisis, whereas Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005)
provide recent evidence on how low lenders’ effective recovery rates (“hair cuts”) can be. To the extent that
borrowers’ costs do not automatically and fully translate into gains accrued by lenders, default events can
entail significant deadweight losses. We show below how deadweight losses are incorporated into our model.
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two-period context, it is rational for the sovereign to default if and only if the
repayment obligation exceeds losses due to enforcement. Repayments are state-
contingent:
where 
Thus, there exists a critical value e, such that the borrower repays the debt if
and only if the random shock ε≥e. In others words, repayment is rational only for
relatively high realizations of output.
Effects of Volatility on Loan Supply
Turning to the supply side of the loan market, we depart from the standard for-
mulation (Sachs and Cohen, 1985; and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) in which
lenders can impose sanctions but do not capture any output. Nor do we assume, at
the other extreme, that the capture technology is perfect. We allow for deadweight
losses in that the lender’s effective recovery is less than the defaulter’s losses. We
model this as follows.
Let the size of the default be given by the difference between the contractual
repayment obligation RLD and actual repayments P:
In addition to the direct costs to lenders (which possibly include administra-
tive, legal, and political costs), we assume that default involves a negative exter-
nality. For instance, default in one country may increase the risk of default by
other borrowers through contagion effects. Such spillover costs create a wedge
between repayments and the return to lenders. We assume that spillover is pro-
portional to the size of the default: default of size S imposes a total cost (1+q)S on
the lender. The net return to the lender is given by the difference between con-
tractual repayments and total default costs:
In keeping with the standard assumption in the literature, we consider a com-
petitive market for international lending with risk-neutral lenders. This implies that
lenders choose RL to break even. However, the break-even interest rate varies with
D as the level of indebtedness affects the default probability. When debt is low rel-
ative to mean income, the threat of capture precludes default, so the competitive
contractual interest rate RL coincides with the risk-free rate. At higher levels of debt,
default becomes increasingly more likely. For the lender to break even, the interest
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rate spread RL(D) − R must increase with D, giving rise to the standard upward
sloping supply curve for debt. This curve is truncated above some Dmax because the
required break-even interest rate would rise without bound with higher debt. More
significant for our purposes, RL is increasing in the variance of shocks: the return
to lenders is concave in ε, so that an increase in variance needs to be compensated
by higher RL for lenders to break even. In other words, increased volatility causes
the entire loan supply schedule to shift upward, as shown in Figure 1.
Optimal Debt Choice and Volatility
We assume that the sovereign borrower cares only about the expected utility of
period-2 consumption and has a concave utility function U:4
Consumption in period 2 is contingent on default. Let the distribution of
shocks be given by the density function π(ε). Denoting the consumption level in
the event of default as Cdef and in the event of “no default” as Cnodef, the borrower’s
problem is to choose D to maximize expected utility:
subject to the condition that contractual interest rates satisfy the break-even condition.
Max U C d U C Dd e f
eR D
nodef eR D m
L
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4A more general model would allow for consumption in each period and let investment be distinct
from the level of borrowing. Such a model, however, yields the same essential relationship as described in
this model. In particular, it sheds no additional light on the relationship between volatility and default risk.
The main difference lies in the fact that greater investment increases the collateral that lenders can capture
in the event of default. A similar mechanism of achieving higher future consumption smoothing through
greater seizeable collateral is discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 422–25).
η( ε η max
Figure 1. Effects of Volatility on Spreads and Borrowing Ceilings
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To describe the solution to this problem, we introduce additional notation. For
any D, let φ(D) denote the ex ante probability of default. Define the utilities of
consumption over default and nondefault states as follows:
We now have the following proposition.
Proposition 1
At any interior solution D* to the sovereign borrower’s optimization problem, we
have the following:
The appendix provides a formal proof, but the intuition is straightforward.
Debt is costly: in outcomes where default does not occur, the cost of carrying debt
in this model is D(RL − R). At the same time, debt is valuable because it provides
partial insurance against adverse shocks. The optimally chosen level of debt rec-
onciles the marginal cost of debt with its benefits.
Significant for our purpose, the form of the solution provides insight into the
relationship between income volatility and the likelihood of default. Consider a
mean-preserving spread in the distribution of income shocks. Because of the con-
cavity of the utility function, MUdef rises faster than MUnodef so that the right-hand
side must rise.5 To restore equality, φ(D) must rise. In other words, higher volatil-
ity of income is associated with greater ex ante probability of default.
Note, in contrast, that the effect of volatility on the level of optimal debt is
ambiguous and will depend on the borrower’s degree of risk aversion. Greater
volatility increases the risk premium for any given level of debt; this makes debt
costlier, reducing the incentive to borrow. At the same time, greater volatility in con-
sumption increases the incentive to borrow to smooth consumption. Given these
opposing tendencies, the overall effect is ambiguous and, as simulations in Catão
and Kapur (2004) show for plausible functional forms, can even be nonmonotonic.
It is useful to contrast the role of volatility in this model with that in Eaton and
Gersovitz’s (1981) classic model. In their infinite horizon model, default results in
permanent exclusion from capital markets. To the extent that greater volatility
increases the penalty of exclusion for borrowers, higher levels of volatility increase
the incentive to repay and can support higher levels of debt. In our two-period
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5Strictly speaking, this argument requires that, at the optimum, e(RL(D*),D*)—the threshold below
which the borrower defaults—is increasing in the volatility of shocks. This is easy to check directly. See
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consumption smoothing, but also on the terms on which they borrow (that is, the
spread). This allows for richer possibilities, including the theoretical possibility
that greater volatility leads to higher risk of default. But, ultimately, the proof of
the pudding is in the eating. As the econometric results presented next over-
whelmingly indicate, volatility appears to be positively associated with higher
default risk and lower borrowing on average.
II. Empirics
In light of the above model, testing the proposed explanation for debt intolerance
requires empirically establishing two results. First, default risk should rise with
income volatility, holding other factors constant. In general, default risk can be
measured by the interest rate spread on sovereign debt, or by the observed fre-
quency of sovereign “credit events,” such as defaults and rescheduling of repay-
ment. Given the lack of consistent long series on sovereign spreads, we choose, as
the dependent variable in our regressions, the actual incidence of credit events
over the period from 1970 to 2001.6
The second testable implication of the theory is that, although countries with
greater volatility desire more debt than less volatile ones, they face more stringent
borrowing conditions. Within the confines of the two-period setup, borrowing
becomes more stringent because lending to more volatile countries is riskier; they
face higher spreads, which dampens borrowing. This effect may be self-reinforcing
in a richer multiperiod context. Suppose, for example, that greater volatility leads
to greater frequency of default and raises the spreads. With higher spreads, the
value of access to capital markets goes down, making default less costly. If the
value of access decreases, the terms of access to capital markets may remain poor
for highly volatile countries.
Table 1 reports some relevant descriptive statistics for a set of 26 developing
countries that are mostly middle-income economies and that have been regular
customers in private international capital markets.7 Because a substantial share of
these countries’external borrowing has been undertaken by the respective national
governments whose debt-servicing problems have typically been the main trigger
of sovereign defaults, the reported debt statistics exclude the domestic private sec-
tor external obligations. As in the remainder of the discussion, the focus is then on
public sector external debt.8
6The main source of discontinuity in emerging market spread data is the transition from syndicated
loans as the main borrowing instrument in the 1970s and 1980s to bond financing in the 1990s. Moreover,
existing bond spread data for much of the 1990s suffers from a coverage bias, because the only countries
represented are those that defaulted in the 1980s and converted their debt into Brady bonds. The unavail-
ability of sufficiently long country spread series partly explains why other researchers also used actual
information on credit events in probit or logit specifications in their empirical analyses of sovereign risk
(for example, Feder and Just, 1977; Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; and Reinhart, 2002).
7We exclude low-income countries because they rely much more on concessional and official multi-
lateral debt, for which our model is less relevant. A similar cutoff has been adopted by RRS.
8Moreover, private sector debt statistics are not very reliable for emerging markets. This is because
they rely on accurate balance of payments recording of private sector transactions or alternatively rely on
firm-level survey data, rarely available for the entire 30-year period.
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Table 1. Selected Macroeconomic and Debt Statistics, 1970–2001
In-Sample Credit Events
Ypc_us D/Y D/X σ∆yr σ∆TOT
Defaults Reschedulings (US$) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Argentina 2 0 7.7 23.5 252.1 5.1 13.6
Brazil 1 0 3.5 22.5 252.6 4.3 11.8
Chile 2 1 4.6 31.8 133.5 6.1 12.6
Colombia 0 0 1.9 23.5 152.5 2.4 14.7
Costa Rica 1 0 4.0 52.5 153.4 3.6 8.7
Ecuador 2 0 1.1 57.5 200.4 5.6 21.8
Mexico 1 0 5.8 27.7 173.6 3.7 18.9
Panama 1 0 3.4 62.3 92.9 5.4 11.2
Peru 1 2 2.0 37.5 247.5 5.5 11.8
Uruguay 1 0 6.0 34.0 169.2 4.1 11.5
Venezuela 1 0 5.0 36.0 132.8 4.4 31.8
India 0 0 0.5 17.6 247.1 3.0 6.6
Indonesia 0 1 0.7 35.7 143.4 4.1 15.7
Korea 0 0 9.8 6.6 23.1 3.8 6.6
Malaysia 0 0 3.9 24.2 39.1 6.6 7.6
Pakistan 1 0 0.4 52.7 427.5 2.6 13.5
Philippines 1 0 1.0 33.1 120.9 3.6 8.3
Thailand 0 0 2.0 14.6 49.2 4.4 9.5
Singapore 0 0 23.0 2.1 0.4 4.0 4.4
Egypt 1 0 1.5 43.9 215.1 4.1 12.8
Bulgaria 1 0 1.5 52.8 133.1 5.5 18.3
Hungary 0 0 4.8 44.6 117.8 4.5 11.6
Poland 1 0 4.1 36.5 162.6 6.3 3.7
Russia 2 0 1.8 48.0 132.5 6.7 13.9
South Africa 1 0 2.9 2.0 7.5 2.3 6.5
Turkey 1 0 3.0 22.4 231.3 4.4 6.2
Mean 0.85 0.15 4.1 32.5 154.3 4.5 12.1
Sources: Credit event data from Lindert and Morton (1989), Beim and Calomiris (2000), and
IMF staff. Other data from IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank country database, and
authors’own calculations.
Notes: Ypc_us= Per capita GDP in US$ thousands in year 2000.
D/Y= Debt-to-GDP ratio, 1970–2001 average.
D/X = Debt-to-export ratio, 1970–2001 average.
σ∆yr = Standard deviation of real GDP growth, 1970–2001.
σ∆TOT = Standard deviation of terms of trade growth, 1970–2001.
The first noteworthy feature of the data is the recurrence of credit events
(defined as defaults or rescheduling) in some countries and the complete absence
of such events in others. As noted earlier, studies that consider longer periods con-
firm the impression of serial correlation in default (Lindert and Morton, 1989; and
RRS). Table 1 also suggests that this pattern is not necessarily correlated with per
capita income (measured in thousands of 2000 U.S. dollars, Ypc_us). Some serial
defaulters (for example, Argentina) are several times richer than countries that
never defaulted (for example, India).
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The second interesting feature of the data is that an average emerging market
debt-to-GDP ratio (D/Y) of 33 percent is not only unremarkable, but also much
lower than those commonly observed for most advanced countries. Within our
sample, the majority of serial defaulters have low to moderate debt ratios. Year-by-
year inspection of the data (not shown here because of space constraints) indicates
that for most of the defaulters the debt-to-GDP ratios on the eve of their defaults
were less than 40 percent. Table 1 also indicates that once debt is scaled by exports
(D/X), rather than by GDP, the correlation between default events and debt bur-
dens tightens considerably, although some important outliers remain. As shown
below, regression results corroborate this prima facie association, lending support
to the widespread use of the debt-to-export ratio as a risk indicator in countries’
credit rating assessments.
But arguably the most striking association highlighted in Table 1 is the
one between those credit events and macroeconomic volatility. All of the serial
defaulters in our sample (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Russia) had uncon-
ditional output volatility (σ∆yr) above the sample average. Because the latter is, in
turn, about twice as high as the average output volatility of OECD economies 
during the same period, it follows that serial defaulters are indeed highly volatile
economies. In contrast, nondefaulting countries, such as Colombia, India, Korea,
Thailand, Singapore, and Hungary, all have below average output volatility.9 Of
course, such association does not imply causality, because default events may
themselves be a source of output volatility. Yet, using external terms of trade as an
indicator of both the exogenously determined component and the purchasing
power of national output,10 it also appears that countries with more volatile TOT
appear to default more often. This can be seen from the fact that nearly all Latin
American emerging markets (in the first 12 rows of the table) had both eventful
credit histories and relatively high TOT volatility, whereas all default-free Asian
economies (positioned in the middle of the table) had much lower TOT volatility.
TOT volatility has also been relatively high among all Eastern European default-
ers, with the exception of Poland.
To understand these relationships more rigorously, and to test their robustness
to the inclusion of other variables featured in previous studies, we estimate a dis-
crete choice model of the default probability. As suggested by the theoretical dis-
cussion in Section I, the default probability can be generally written as the
following function:
φη σ ε = ( ) fD R Y q , ,,,, , ( ) 9
9South Africa would also fit this story if not for the external political sanctions that triggered the 1985
default. Malaysia is the biggest outlier in the default-volatility association, but its outlier behavior is cru-
cially dependent on the inclusion of the Asian crisis in the sample. In fact, when the Asian crisis years of
1997–99 are taken out of the sample, the association between output volatility and default frequency is fur-
ther reinforced for Asian economies.
10Use of external TOT as a yardstick of the exogenous component of domestic income volatility is
consistent with evidence from the developing country business cycle literature, which estimates that TOT
accounts for nearly one-half of overall income volatility in developing countries (Mendoza, 1995). Kose
and Riezman (2001) report similar estimates disaggregating between export and import prices.
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where ∂φ / ∂D > 0, ∂φ / ∂R > 0, ∂φ / ∂– Y < 0, ∂φ / ∂η < 0, and ∂φ / ∂σε > 0, while
the sign of ∂φ/∂q is ambiguous. The sign is ambiguous because of the existence
of a range of sufficiently high values of q, which depress debt to an extent that
default risk is lowered (see Catão and Kapur, 2004, for a discussion and numeri-
cal illustrations of this point).
In deciding whether to model the discrete choice between the nonevent “0”
(nondefault in our case) and the realization of the event “1” (default), empirical
researchers are divided between the use of a logit or a probit specification. In most
cases, the differences are not significant (see Greene, 2000, p. 815, for a discussion
and references). One approach is to choose logit or probit on the basis of standard
maximum likelihood criteria given the same set of left-hand-side variables. On this
basis, we chose a logit specification because it fits the data slightly better.
Table 2 reports the results for a variety of alternative specifications over the
panel of countries listed in Table 1. To mitigate potential endogeneity biases, all
ratios and level variables enter the regressions lagged one period, and the respec-
tive z-statistics are corrected for country-specific heteroscedasticity using the stan-
dard White procedure. In addition, to mitigate the endogeneity biases arising from
the fact that debt crises have their own intrinsic dynamics that can exacerbate a
country’s historic volatility, all observations between the time of default and the
end of a debt crisis (as measured by the country’s reentry into capital markets as
defined in Beim and Calomiris, 2000, pp. 32–6) are dropped from the regression.11
The list of explanatory variables includes the following: We take the U.S. 10-year
bond rate, deflated by the current U.S. CPI, as a proxy for the risk-free (real) inter-
est rate, and denote it as r*. We include export to GDP as an explanatory variable
in some regressions; this may be viewed as a proxy for the capture rate η, which
the existing literature typically associates with trade disruption (Bulow and Rogoff,
1989; and Rose, 2002).12 The volatility variable σygap refers to the standard devi-
ation of the ratio between actual and trend or “potential” real GDP (the so-called
“output gap”), computed over the previous 10 years at each point in time and
rolled forward year on year.13
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the results of a specification that includes the
risk-free interest rate r*, the volatility of output, and the ratios of debt to potential
output (D/Yp) and export to GDP (X/Y). Estimated coefficients on the risk-free rate
r* and the output volatility variable σygap take on the expected sign and are highly
significant statistically. The coefficients on D/Ypand X/Yhave the correct sign, but
these are estimated with much less precision. Because they have a similar order of
magnitude and opposite signs, however, this suggests that they can be combined
11This procedure is similar to that adopted by Frankel and Rose (1996) in their well-known study on
the determinants of currency crises.
12We also experimented with the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, but the export-to-GDP ratio was
the openness indicator closest to statistical significance.
13Potential real GDP is derived from an HP-filter with the smoothing parameter λ set to 7 as suggested
in Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, p. 47) for annual data. The use of a 10-year moving window allows for
slowly evolving changes in the underlying distribution of shocks over time for any given country. Such
rolling volatility measures have also been used in studies on the impact of TOT instability on economic
growth (for example, Mendoza, 1997; and Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson, 2006).
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in a single indicator—the ratio of debt to exports. Column (2) reports the results
with the debt-to-export variable, which is clearly statistically significant at 5 per-
cent. As before, r* and σygap remain important determinants of default risk, and the
regression passes the Wald test for joint significance with flying colors. Moreover,
while a pseudo-R2 of 0.23 may appear low, it is in fact marginally higher than in
other empirical studies applying logit/probit models to sovereign risk analysis (see
Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; and Reinhart, 2002).
Columns (3) and (4) report the results of experimenting with the credit history
variable used in RRS—the proportion of years the country was in default since
1820. Column (3) indicates that this variable is not statistically significant at any
conventional level. Interestingly, however, once the volatility variable σygap is
dropped from the regressions as shown in column (4), the credit history variable
becomes significant at the 5 percent borderline. This suggests that the credit
history indicator is a catchall variable proxying the more fundamental effects of
underlying macroeconomic volatility on sovereign risk. In other words, this result
suggests that countries that defaulted more often in the past are more likely to
default more often in the future to the extent that the underlying sources of output
volatility in these economies continue unabated.
Also important, our results indicate that the significance of the volatility vari-
able is robust to the inclusion of a wide array of explanatory variables featured in
the sovereign debt literature. The ratio of net foreign exchange reserves to imports
(Fxnet/M) may capture liquidity factors and, as such, is widely used in empirical
analyses of country risk (Edwards, 1984; Eichengreen and Portes, 1986; Cantor
and Packer, 1996; and Hu, Kiesel, and Perraudin, 2002). As shown in column (5),
however, this variable falls short of statistical significance at 5 percent. Its fail-
ure to improve the model’s fit is clearly corroborated by the virtually unchanged
pseudo-R2 of the regression that includes it relative to the one that does not (see
column (3)). Conversely, an indicator of real exchange rate misalignment (the real
effective exchange rate gap), which also features prominently in empirical studies
of currency and debt crises (see, for example, Frankel and Rose, 1996), does much
better.14 This is not surprising because this variable captures debt-denomination
effects on sovereign risk that, while abstracted from the simple model of Section I,
are deemed to be important (see Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999).
The second variable of significance is the ratio of debt service to exports, with
the inclusion of this variable substantially improving the fit of the regressions as
shown in the last two columns of Table 2. This, again, is not surprising because, in
a world in which debt maturity varies widely across countries and over time, debt
service is arguably a more effective proxy for the next period’s repayment costs fea-
tured in the theoretical model. And partly because of its obvious collinearity
between the debt-service-to-export ratio (DS_X) and the D/X variable, the DS_X
variable clearly dwarfs the former. Column (8) thus reports estimates for which
the D/X variable is dropped and the DS/X variable enters as the only debt burden
14As others have done, we measure misalignment by deviations of the IMF’s real effective exchange
rate index from a univariate trend, which, in our case, is again derived from an HP-filter with the smooth-
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indicator. Finally, we have tested the best-fit models in columns (7) and (8) with
the addition of several variables that appear in other studies, including per capita
income, real GDP growth, and regional dummies. None of these variables proved
to be statistically significant at 5 or 10 percent.
We further test the robustness of the hypothesis that domestic volatility raises
default risk by checking whether this holds for alternative volatility measures. In
particular, one potential criticism of the results of Table 2 is that output gap volatil-
ity is not strictly endogenous to the extent that it may be a byproduct of default
risk perceptions and possibly a lingering outcome of the country’s previous repay-
ment history. Another potential concern is that the output volatility measure of
Table 2 does not distinguish between expected and unexpected shocks to GDP.
Although this distinction does not play a role in the theoretical setup of Section I,
it may be important in practice and it needs to be considered.
Estimation results in Table 3 address both types of concerns. As before, all
explanatory variables are lagged one period except for the TOT indicator (which,
as discussed earlier, can be taken as exogenous), and the respective z-statistics are
corrected for country-specific heteroscedasticity. Using TOT volatility as a gauge
for domestic output volatility, the estimates show that our previous results hold: not
only is TOT volatility statistically significant, but also the overall fit of the regres-
sions does not change much. This is so irrespective of whether one uses the debt
stock-to-export ratio (D/X) as the indicator of debt burden (and hence of the gains
of defaulting) or, alternatively, the debt service-to-export ratio (DS/X). This result
also holds whether one uses 5-year or 10-year rolling standard deviations of TOT.
The only noticeable difference with regard to results in Table 2 is that the D/X vari-
able is only significant at 10 percent.
Table 3 also shows (columns (3) and (7)) estimates with 10-year rolling stan-
dard deviations of the residuals of a country-specific real GDP growth forecasting
equation (σ10_εy) aimed at capturing unanticipated shocks to output. Following
Ramey and Ramey (1995), such a growth forecasting equation includes two lags
of real GDP levels, a linear time trend and a segmented trend broken in 1974.15
This shock volatility indicator has the expected positive sign and is also significant
at 5 percent, although the classic generated regressor bias problem tends to detract
from its statistical significance. Finally, we consider a small variant of the former
measure by including two lags of TOT in the growth forecasting equation. This
makes the residual (σ10_εxtot) less correlated with the TOT volatility indicator and
more likely to capture unexpected shocks associated with other variables, such as
fiscal and monetary policies. The results reported in columns (4) and (8) indicate
that this measure is not significant at 5 percent, which may be due to the genera-
tor bias problem noted above. In both cases, TOT volatility remains highly statis-
tically significant.
Having shown that default probability is positively and significantly related to
output and TOT volatility controlling for other factors, we now turn to the evidence
pertaining to the impact of volatility on indebtedness levels. Section I established
15As discussed in their paper, this measure is consistent with the hypothesis of a unit root as well as
with the alternative of a trend-stationary or a segmented-trend stationary real GDP.
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that the net effect of volatility on indebtedness is ambiguous on purely theoretical
grounds but that sensible model calibrations suggest the direction of the effect to be
mostly negative. The remainder of this section tests this hypothesis.
As discussed in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), econometric estimation of the
effect of income volatility on debt levels is not trivial. In part, this is because of the
potential presence of a credit ceiling under which standard ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates tend be inconsistent due to the truncated nature of the distribution.
In addition, such a credit ceiling shifts according to the various parameters of the
model. One way to model this problem—which has been advanced in Maddala and
Nelson (1974) and used by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) as well as in several other
distinct macro applications (for example, Portes and Winter, 1980)—is to assume
that debt at any given point in time is determined within either of the two regimes:
one in which demand factors predominate and one in which the supply constraint
becomes binding (see Maddala, 1986, for a comprehensive discussion and further
references on the underlying econometric issues).
Since a switch between these two regimes in practice is likely, and given that
dmax is unobserved, the proposed estimation technique that allows for this possi-
bility amounts to estimating the following system:
where d* t is a point in the demand schedule before d approaches the maximum
debt threshold regime. The main estimation challenges in this case are that (1)  d*
it
and dmaxit are unobserved, and (2) there must be a meaningful way to distinguish
the supply constrained regime from its alternative, the “unconstrained” market
equilibrium regime. Conditional upon the latter requirement, a maximum likeli-
hood method for this type of model has been advanced by Maddala and Nelson
(1974). In what follows, we thus estimate equation (10) by full maximum likeli-
hood using OLS estimates as the starting values for the nonlinear optimization.
Regarding identification, we discriminate between the two regimes by introduc-
ing in the dmax equation a dummy variable z0it, which equals one for periods in
which the country is in default (when indebtedness is known to be supply con-
strained) and zero otherwise.
The results are reported in Table 4. In light of the theoretical model of Section
I, we start with a baseline specification that expresses the debt-to-GDP ratio as
function of underlying income volatility (as before, proxied by the 10-year rolling
standard deviation of the output gap) and trade openness.16 Clearly, such a highly
parsimonious model should not be expected to fully capture the complexity of
sovereign indebtedness decisions. Yet, as it turns out, its predictions regarding the
dg q
dh q z
i y it it













min , * () max 10
16As others have done (for example, Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), we express those ratio variables in
natural logs. Using the export-to-GDP ratio instead of the export-plus-imports-to-GDP ratio does not alter
the thrust of the results. In the absence of other information, we assume the deadweight loss parameter q
to be constant throughout the estimation.
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effects of volatility on borrowing are not overturned by richer specifications.
Consistent with our theoretical model, higher income volatility shifts downward
the maximum debt threshold (dmax), with column (1) estimates indicating that a 
1 percentage point change in the underlying real GDP volatility leads to a 
12 percent decline in the dmax, all else constant (the semi-elasticity estimate is
basically unchanged across specifications). Likewise, consistent with the model,
greater trade openness (a proxy for default costs, as already discussed) tends to
increase dmax, while the coefficient on the default period dummy Zo also takes
on the expected positive sign. Regarding the unconstrained regime d*, the base-
line specification estimates are no less sensible. Consistent with the consump-
tion smoothing motive for borrowing, volatility affects debt positively, and
although the respective coefficient is imprecisely estimated (as witnessed by the
z-statistic of 0.66), we shall see below that it will become highly statistically sig-
nificant in more comprehensive specifications. The openness indicator takes on
a negative sign and is highly significant, supporting the view that higher default
costs in a volatile environment with nontrivial default probabilities tend to dis-
courage borrowing.
This baseline specification is then augmented in column (2) by the (one-period-
lagged) GDP growth rate. The effects of economic growth on optimal debt are
important for the reasons, among others, laid out in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981): on
the one hand, a higher growth rate of domestic income tends to encourage borrow-
ing for Fisherian reasons (that is, some of the future income is desired now); on the
other hand, higher growth may reduce a lender’s capture power (for instance, by
lowering the cost of a future credit embargo). Our estimates indicate that although
the effect of growth in the supply constrained regime is consistent with the Eaton-
Gersovitz mechanism, its effect on optimal debt in the unconstrained regime is
opposite to that postulated by the Eaton-Gersovitz demand for borrowing—that is,
higher GDP growth tends to discourage rather than encourage borrowing. This
result, however, is not implausible and can be easily rationalized.17 More relevant to
the core of our hypothesis is the fact that the signs and statistical significance of the
estimated coefficients on both the unconstrained and constrained regimes are con-
sistent with this paper’s proposed explanation for debt intolerance. The main differ-
ence with the baseline specification is the coefficient on the volatility variable in the
unconstrained regime, which now appears to be highly significant statistically. In
addition, this highly positive coefficient suggests that the volatility-induced effect on
debt demand is strong before the supply constraint kicks in with a vengeance. On
average, inspection of the fitted values for this regression indicates that 30 percent
of the fitted values falls on the d* regime, with 70 percent falling on the constrained
17It is possible, for instance, that this opposite sign reflects the shortcomings of proxying future
growth potential on the basis of lagged growth (although Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, use the same lagged
indicator). Some multicollinearity is also possible between volatility and the growth rate indicator for the
reasons highlighted in Ramey and Ramey (1995)—that is, the existence of a statistically significant asso-
ciation between volatility and growth. Indeed, the sharp change in the coefficient of the volatility variable
after growth is included in the unconstrained regime suggests that multicollinearity plays a role. Finally, it
may also be conjectured that higher growth tends to improve the sovereign budget, hence mitigating bor-
rowing needs.
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regime, thereby indicating that the supply constraint for these countries is binding
most of the time. This finding is clearly consistent with the view of debt intolerance
being a systematic rather than episodic phenomenon.
The remainder of Table 4 reiterates the robustness of the above results. Adding
countries’ U.S. dollar per capita income as an explanatory variable (see column
(3)) and using TOT instead of real GDP variance has an impact only on the mag-
nitude of the effect rather than on its direction or statistical significance. Finally,
estimates reported in column (4) add a variable that the political economy litera-
ture has deemed as an important determinant of fiscal performance and hence of
debt accumulation—namely, a country’s degree of political stability (Alesina and
Drazen, 1991; and Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini, 1992).18 In tandem with
the findings of this literature, which postulates that politically less stable countries
tend to run more persistent fiscal deficits and hence demand more debt, we find
that greater political stability tends to lower debt. At the same time, the estimates
also show that the inclusion of this additional variable does not change the thrust
of the previous results—with volatility and openness remaining significant deter-
minants of sovereign indebtedness. Finally, as in previous specifications, the
model’s fitted values classify that the majority of observations (77 percent) belong
to the supply constrained regime, thus clearly indicating that volatility depresses
rather than encourages borrowing most of the time.
III. Conclusions
The fact that most sovereign defaults have taken place in countries with low to
moderate debt-to-income ratios is puzzling. This puzzle is all the more remarkable
when one notes that many other sovereigns have far-higher debt ratios and con-
tinue to borrow at much lower spreads. While reputation and cross-country differ-
ences in credit histories have been invoked as reasons, such explanations raise a
number of thorny questions as discussed above.
This paper argues that cross-country differences in underlying macroeco-
nomic volatility are at least part of the answer and are a key missing link that rec-
onciles the standard theory of sovereign borrowing with the empirical evidence on
the debt-intolerance phenomenon. The root of our argument is not something new.
It is well documented that many emerging markets are more volatile than both
their advanced counterparts and other developing country peers, and that this
volatility comes from diverse sources—from TOT volatility associated with nar-
row commodity specialization to institutions that are conducive to destabilizing
economic policies (see Gavin and others, 1996; Talvi and Végh, 2002; Acemoglu
and others, 2003; and Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson, 2006). Given the case
made by Acemoglu and others (2003), that exogenous institutional factors seem to
be at the root of much of this underlying volatility, this paper has focused on the
effects—rather than the causes—of such volatility on sovereign default risk and
optimal indebtedness. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that, historically,
18The political stability variable is the widely used Freedom House index, ranging from 0 (maximum
political instability) to 1 (fully stable democracy).
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more volatile countries tend to carry a higher default risk and face a lower credit
ceiling, even when one controls for a host of other variables. In addition, our
econometric estimates indicate that supply constraints are binding most of the time
(just over two-thirds of the sample observations), thereby suggesting that market
intolerance to higher indebtedness among this group of countries is a systematic
rather than an episodic phenomenon. This finding corroborates that of RRS, using
a different methodology and slightly different country coverage.
This paper’s emphasis on the role of volatility in sovereign risk does not rule
out other factors previously identified in the literature. One such factor is currency-
denomination mismatches in borrowers’balance sheets and the associated role of
exchange rate misalignment in debt crises (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999 and
2005). Although isolating the role of income volatility on sovereign borrowing in
a tractable way has led us to abstract from the balance sheet channel in our theo-
retical analysis, such effects have been controlled for in our regressions. As seen
above, the respective results corroborate the importance of this variable, consis-
tent with what previous researchers have found. Similarly, by focusing on the
effects of underlying or structural macroeconomic volatility on debt servicing, we
are not necessarily rejecting an autonomous role for sovereign reputation. Our
results do suggest that macroeconomic volatility is a fundamental factor that,
among other things, can easily manifest in unsound credit histories and hence
shape reputation.
Some implications follow directly from these results. First, contrary to the clas-
sic Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) mechanism—which suggests that volatility might
lower the incentive to default—we find that volatility does not raise countries’
credit ceilings; in fact, the opposite occurs. Although the literature on sovereign
debt observes that defaults tend to occur during extreme economic downturns,
thus implying that countries that face such events more frequently carry a higher
risk, a significant contribution of this paper’s empirical analysis has been to model
and test this proposition conditional on a variety of other factors. Our findings also
qualify a key inference drawn by RRS. In their view, a sovereign’s reputation
(built over decades or centuries) is a crucial determinant of debt intolerance. Thus,
overcoming the latter would require many of today’s emerging economies to dra-
matically lower their debt ratios to the point at which their default risk is suffi-
ciently low (their estimated threshold being as low as 15 percent in some cases),
so that debt becomes “sustainable.” This would then make possible a gradual
buildup of reputation, which would eventually enhance the countries’ borrowing
capacity. Aside from the point that their own empirical analysis suggests that grad-
ual deleveraging is hard to accomplish and that reputation building is a painfully
slow process, our model cautions that such debt-reduction strategies may be sub-
optimal if they preclude feasible consumption smoothing and do not ultimately
address the sources of domestic income volatility.
This takes us to a paradoxical aspect of the debt-intolerance phenomenon high-
lighted by this paper’s results. On the one hand, more volatile countries have
greater need for international borrowing for consumption smoothing purposes; on
the other hand, these are precisely the countries that will face the most stringent
constraints on their borrowing capacity because of the default risk that volatility
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itself engenders. Thus, by reducing volatility, a country can improve its maximum
indebtedness threshold but at the same time reduce its desire for debt. Which effect
will prevail is an empirical issue; in practice, this will partly depend on other
motives driving international borrowing besides consumption smoothing. Provided
that these other motives are sufficiently weighty, reducing macroeconomic volatil-
ity should translate to more, rather than less, emerging market borrowing. In addi-
tion, because the sovereign spread is a well-known benchmark when setting interest
rates for the domestic private sector, by reducing the former, lower macroeconomic
volatility should be instrumental in helping reduce the latter and thus positively
affect economic growth. Thus, this channel linking volatility and sovereign spreads
is one other plausible explanation for the inverse relationship between output and
TOT volatility and economic growth extensively documented elsewhere (Ramey
and Ramey, 1995; Mendoza, 1997; Agénor and Aizenman, 1998; and Blattman,
Hwang, and Williamson, 2006).
Finally, our theoretical and empirical analyses both suggest an alternative
channel through which countries’ borrowing capacity can be increased without
lowering volatility and depressing sovereign loan demand. This channel is the
lenders’“capture technology,” as represented by parameters η and q in our model.
While the effectiveness of this mechanism is constrained by the limits imposed
by national sovereignty, it is clear that if an economy is open enough that default
entails potentially significant trade and other output losses (a higher η), and debt
recovery plus spillover default losses are not overly high (that is, q is sufficiently
low), then lenders will be more assured that default is less likely. This will shift
downward the loan supply schedule, thereby raising the sovereign’s credit ceil-
ing. The empirical significance of this mechanism is overwhelmingly supported
by our econometric results, which indicate that higher openness reduces default
probability and raises the maximum debt threshold. To the extent that greater bor-
rowing capacity tends to enhance an economy’s growth potential, this also pro-
vides a rationale for the empirical results reported in Kose, Prasad, and Terrones
(2006) that greater trade openness tends to mitigate the well-documented trade-off
between volatility and economic growth. Thus, provided that it does not generate
some volatility of its own, greater trade openness naturally emerges as instrumen-
tal in mitigating the impact of higher domestic volatility on default risk.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
Let RL(D) be a functional relationship that defines the break-even constraint. Given RL(D), the
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The first-order condition for an interior maximum (provided it exists) is VD = 0, where
Noting that the break-even constraint 
we use this relation in the first-order condition to derive:
Rearranging the above equation yields:
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